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Chapter I.
Introduction.
"Without corporations America would be a different
country and have a different history."
The word corporation,vast as is its meaning and
importcreates in the mind of the average layman a men-
tal picture not to be admired.
He sees a large number of organizations starting
under most brilliant prospects ending in disastrous
failure. He hears and believesand undoubtedly in
many cases has the right to so believe,of judges bribed
and legislators corrupted, cities made and unmade; po-
litical methods dictated and a general unscrupulous con-
trol exercised by these vast aggregations of capital.
He therefore becomes fully convinced that the
corporation is hostile to -iis interest and is a legiti-
mate object of prey. He probably has not heard that
the corporation is a being invisible and intangible
without a soul,but he does know that it has a treasury
and if there is any one moral dogma upon which the
people,as a whole,unite,it is that in defrauding a cor-
porationno sin is committed.
But the student of social movements,especially
the American studentin looking over the field which his
own country affordsbeholds another picture.
He sees vast stretches of railway crossing and re-
crossing our statesbinding them together by iron bands.
He sees barren lands made fertile;vast swamps reclaimed
and peoples brought into closer communion.
He notes the absence of famine and protracted wars
the increased happiness and prosperity of the people.
4ind in seeking for the reason of all these remarkable
growths and changes,he discovers that the railroad
corporation is the secret of them all.
True indeed the nistory of railroads and corpora-
tions in general would not be the most fruitful field
of moral ethicsbut it is also true tnat the man who
opens up vast stretches of country; who cheapens the
price and increases the supply of the necessaries of
life is the greatest benefactor: and in judging we must
not only consider the means but the ends.
It is not the intention of this paper to enter
into a discussion of the comparative merits of corporate
benefits and evilsbut to consider the business corpora-
tion from a legal point of views briefly of necessity.
The corporation at present absorbs a large part of
the administrative and executive ability which formerly
sought political life and herein lies the explanation
of the marked change in the attitude of the corporation
towards the public.
Chapter II.
The Ancient Business Corporation.
The idea of a corporation as a legal creation is
not a modern onefor the paternity of the fiction, if
such a thing can beis credited to the Romans.
Some even trace the organization oak to the
Greeks,but be that as it may,the corporation las always
been regarded as a legal creation.
The reason for this legal fiction is not apparent
unless it was that by so regarding corporations a satis-
factory solution of many difficulties was arrival at.
Vie could hardly expect the people of those early
times to look forward and anticipate the difficulties
into which this view would lead,any more than we could
expect them to forecast the marvelous growth of this
form of commercial enterprise.
But before proceeding +o trace the development
of tlie business corporation,let us classify the subject
according to the light of present law and advancement.
5Considered from a business stand point,there are
but two classes of corporations.
I. Public corporations - a good example of which
is the New England Township.
2. Private corporations - which include all cor-
porations not included uncter the first head.
Private corporations axe divided into Membership
or non business corporations, not organized for the pur-
pose of profit and having no capital stock,and Business
or Stock corporations organized expressly for pecuniary
gain.
Many other classifications have been made and are
found in the books,but the one here given seems to an-
swer all requirements.
The ancient classification of Sole and Aggregate
and their subdivisions answered the purpose of its time,
but is not applicable to the present,as is illustrated
in the old grouping of business and municipal corpora-
tions,so different under the modern law,under the one
head of civil corporations.
The business corporation differs widely from the
municipal,and is governed,in many instances,by entirely
different principles of law.
The business corporation is a voluntary associa-
tion of individuals; whiile in the municipal corporation,
there exists no contractual re~ation. It oeirg merely
an institution for tfie administration of the affairs of
a community.
If private interests are provided for, the corpora-
tion is a private one.
It is noticable that all classifications are
founded uponi differences in characteristics rather than
in legal treatment.
Among the earliest examples of the business cor-
poration were the organizations of the bakers and boat-
men of Rome.
The Romans also carried on business enterprises
under the form of legal personscalled societatessome
of which obtained the right of becoming corporations.
But these organizations did not prosper to any
marked extent because of the restrictions under which
they existed.
The assent of the sovereign was necessarynot only
for their creationbut al so for their dissolution, thus
making tnem creatures of the emperor's will.
On the other hand they possessed many privileges,
which are embodied in our law at the present time as the
characteristics of tne corporation. They could hold
and dispose of propertyincur obligations for which
members were individually liable-and inherit by succes-
sion, either testamentary or by patronage. Their
capacity to coi-mit a tort was a disputed question.
Early corporations in England.
With the advent of the Romans into Britain came
their customs,anc. among these their features of cor-
porate organization. The earliest of these organiza-
tions seem to have been the peace guilds,the members of
which were pledged to mutual protection.
At the opening of the seventeenth century, there
were only two or three joint stock companies in England,
and they were far from organizations for the promotion
of individual interest only. They were looked upon as
puolic agencies to which had been confided the dc e regu-
lation of foreign trade just as domestic trade was regu-
lated by the guilds.
The first work treating of corporations published
anonymously in 1702,entitled the Law of Corporations,
says "The general intent and end of all civil corpora-
tions is for better government, either special or gene-
ral.'
Law of Corporationspage 2.
This idea can be distinctly observed in the ciiar-
ters granted to subsequent corporations,particularly in
the recitals and provisions.
About the close of the seventeenth century,,the
advantages of corporate organization began to be realiz-
ed. Previous to this time, a few corporations had
existed,the most prominent of which was the East India
Company. But we may say that tae chartering of the
Bank of England in 1694 is the first step in the 6yeat
commercial change.
The wild speculation in shares of companies or-
ganized about the time of the South Sea company is well
knownand over two hundred of these companies were
organized about the year 1726,for all c9nceivable pur-
poseseven that of making salt water fresh.
Anderson's History of Commerce.
Writs of Scire Facias put a speedy end to all that
were not duly incorporatedand this in turn created
such a distrust that only a few of tile strongest
weathered the storm.
Then followed a long period of corporate stagna-
tion, and in 1776 we find Adam Smith expressing the
opinion that the only possible subjects for successful
corporate enterprise were those in which the operatiorf
were capable of being reduced to a routine,and he men-
tions as examples of such,the banking, insurance and
navigation businesses. While we have in our time de-
monstrated the fallacy of the idea as to its exclusive-
ness,yet the subjects enumerated by nim are among those
which are conducted almost exclusively at present by
corporations.
In the time of the early Roman Law, in case of
insolvency the persons constituting the corporation were
obliged to contribute their private fortunes to the
payment of claims of creditors. It is very douotful
whether this doctrine ever obtained in England,all indi-
cations pointing to the prevalence of the rresent conanon
law liability.
The member of a business corporation originally
had the same right to vote as the member of any other
corporation, -one vote for each member. This naturally
became distastefull to the large holders and restric-
tionsvarious in termswere enacted. A certain amount
of stock was made a condition to voting, poolingbeing
allowedhowever. Then followed tne custom of allow-
ing large holders more than one vote. This led to
what v&as called splittifg the stock - that isplacing it
in the hands of friends to be voted. This in turn was
followed in 17ub by tne enactment of a statute requiring
that stock to be voted must have been held at least six
months previous to the election.
Tinls was a most important matter and accounts in
a large degree for our present progress over that of
those earlier times. In these early common law corpora-
tions,the large holders did not always determine the
policy of tne companyas at present.
The Law of England has always been very conser-
vative in matters of formas is illustrated in the
English Companies Act of 1862,whereby it is provided for
a sliding scale of votes based upon the shares i-ld.
The courts nave construea this act allowinj tne
siiares to be distributed in blocks of ten, thus securing
a vote for each shareafter a rounaabout fashion the
act allowing one vote for each of the first ten shares.
Mof fat vs.Farquhar:7 Ch.Div. 591.
Voting by proxy was long denied (iPaige's Chan.
590)ard up to the opening of the present century a by
law authorizing such voting would probably have been
held invalid. 14 N.J.L._222.
As the early corporations were institutions, to
which in most cases,were delegated powers of govermlent,
they were necessarily allowed appropriate means of en-
forcing ainl regulating their authority,and this was done
by means of by-laws.
Business corporations were therefore naturally :,
dealt with in the same mannerjbut with the change in
the conception of a corporation from an institution of
special government to a simply instrumentality for carry-
in: on trade, the right to pass by-laws was restricted
by regulations for tie management of corporate ousiness.
Such regulations being void if contrary to law,aiyl
their validity being to a great extent dependent upon
the discretion of the judges)we see here the commence-
ment of judicial legislation which has been such a po-
tent factor in the development of this branch of the
law.
Previous to the year eigiiteen hundred,the cor-
poration was dissolved in one of the following ways:
(1) By act of Parliament. (2) Natural death of all its
members. (3) Surrender of its franchises. (4) For-
feiture of charter through negligence or abuse of its
franchise.
The second method of dissolution by natural
death of all its members is a peculiar feature of
these early common law corporations,and as is well
knowndoes not exist at present.
Kyd in his work on corporationsspeaking of dis-
solution says 'The effect of the dissolution of a cor-
poration is that all the lands revert to the origirRl
donor, its privileges and franchise are extinguished,
and the members can neither recover debts due to the
corporation,nor be charged with debts contracted by it.
What becomes of the personal estate is perhaps not de-
cided but probably it vests in the crown. "
While this statement of the law as made by Kyd is
true as to the rights and liabilities enforceable in
an action at law, in equity the debts and liabilities
could be enforced.
This is a somewhat different view than 1as here-
tofore obtained,but the case of Naylor vs. Brown decided
in 1 Finch 83 seems authorative upon the question.
The interest of the shareholders in these earlier
corporations differed greatly from our idea of the na-
ture of shareholders interestto wit a fraction of all
the rights and duties of the stockholders.
The old idea was that the corporation held all the
property strictly as trustee and that tineshareholders
were,speaking accurately,cestues que trust - being in
equity the co-owners of the property.
2 Pierre Williams 207.
Thus if the shareholders had in equity the same
interest which the corporation has at law, a share
would be real estate or personalty according to the
nature of the property of the corporation.
Thus we see that the business corporation is not
a spontaneous product,but the result of the development
of earlier institutions running back further than we
can trace.
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As to such points as modern business corporations
have iii conmon with the earlier associationsthe law
antedates any other branch while as to those points
which are features of the business corporations- e-
clusively~the law has been developed almrost entirely-
since the beginning of the present century.
Chapter III.
Inadequacy of the Ancient Corporation.
While the early common law corporation possessed
the monopolistic privileges and the business partner-
ship sufficed for carrying on the ordinary business
affairs, the defects of the corporation were not gene-
rally realized,but with the advancement of society and
the demand for improvements in modes of life,came the
necessity of vast public works requiring imlense capital,
and capital would not invest in undertakings which
were so hampered and repressed by the law. This led,-
to the granting of special charters wfaich extended
special favors in consideration of the work to be done.
The uncertainty of the nature of a share and the
cinaracter of the interest it represented,as said before,
was a great hindrance to corporate growth. The courts
recognized this evil and after deliberation and long
consideration decided that such siares were personalty -
would pass by assignment; and represented a proportionate
interest in the profits and net assets of the company.
But the corporation was still tied up by the an-
cient doctrine that corporations could only act by deed
under their conmmon seal. Blackstone assigns as a
reason that a corporation being an invisible body,
cannot manifest its intention by any personal act or
declaration and therefore speaks only by its couiion
seal. But the corporation has no hand whereby to
annex the seal and if this can be done by an agent,why
cannot the agent do Pny otiner act ?
Even the early law dispensed wita the seal in tie
execution of the most unimportant acts and our present
rule of dispensing with the seal is only a development
dictated by business necessity.
However,until after the commencement of the pres-
ent century, the departure was not extensively allowed.
The recognizing of the share as a substantial
interest created the doctrine of succession and this
feature of joint stock is the distinguishing characteris-
tic of t.e modern corporation.
Tic old idea-of tUe extinguishment of debts to
and from the corporation by its dissolution was detri-
mental to all interests because of the uncertainty of
any dealing with such organizations. This led to the
development of the modern doctrine tnat tne capital
stock was a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.
But tne method of granting special charters was
dangerous and inadequate. The discovery of steam and
the iLmuense capital demanded in its application and
employment led to the enactment of statutes by which
individuals who comply with a few siuple regulations
may secure a charter authorizing them to engage in some
designated bus iness.
This general freedom in the incorporation gave a
great impulse to corporations.
But the greatest inadequacy in the early law of
corporations was in the legal conception of it.
"The present tendency of the courts to look at the
substance and not the form has wrought vast changes in
the law and is along the line of progress. As is
well said by Taylorthe common law conception of a
metaphysical entity separate from the individuals who
composed itarose at a time when corporations were all
created Dy special caarters- wjien very few of tne;a were
stock corporations and when the legal status was wholly
swallowed up in the legal person of the corporation
and wien corporations were as a necessary result of
their creation and positionmonopolies."
Am. Law Rev.XIX. 114.
In tne United States nearly all corporations are
formed under business laws)whic i limit in ch ration,
completely control the corporation and which nake the
stockholders liable personally to some specified Etent
and manner.
Except in the features that they can sue and be
sued;make contractsacquire rights and incur liabilities
in their corporate narne;and that a change in membership
does not work their dissolution these associations
differ very little in their essential attributes from a
partnership.
Taey are in fact a combination of the old conmon
law corporation and the partnership.
The courts in numerous cases do not seeL.. to re-
cognize the ciianges which ave taken place and we find
judges applying the s ame rules and using the same lan-
guage with reference to these modern corporations as
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were applied and used in the case of the purely conimon
law corporations.
We might pattern with profit in tais respect,after
the English courts. These courts in construin- acts
of Parliament similar to our general incorporation laws,
have been careful to distinguish between companies fonn-
ed under these acts and coion law corporations.
Chapter IV.
Development of the Modern Corporation.
Incorporation under general laws.
During the last fifty years the practice of or-
ganizing under special laws has been largely superseded
by general laws permitting corporations to be fomed by
tre voluntary association of at least a specified num-
ber of persons for tae purposes and in the manner
stated in the actsand when organized conferring upon
organizations certain corporate powers which are re-
stricted to those named in 1Ihe act.
The charter of the corporation is part of the
public law and the power of granting such charters is
one appertaining to sovereignty~being in this country
reposed in Congress and in the legislatures of the
States.
The constitutions of the different States make
different and various provisions for the organization
and regulation of these associations. Thus in the
Constitutions of California ( Art.1238)Colorado (Art.15
sect.8) Georgia (Art.4 sect.2) Louisiana (Art.235)
Missouri (Art.12 sect.8) and Penna. (Art. 16 sect.3) we
find provisions that the exercise of tie police power of
the State should never be so construed or abridged as to
permit corporations to conduct their business in such a
manner as to infringe the equal rights of individuaL
and the general well being of the public.
In discussing the power of Congress to create
corporatio ,Mars1allC.J- said: "The power of cremting
a corporation although appertaining to sovereignty is
not like the power of making war and levying taxes or
regulating co:irc e - a great substantive and indepen-
dent power which cannot be implied as incidental to
other powers,or used as a means of executing them. It is
never the end for which other powers are exercised but a
means by which otner objects are accomplished. U
According to the holrifng of numerous courts,the
cnarter and not the organization under it creates the
subscrioers a corporation)at least so as to render con-
tracts in favor of the corporation valid.
Ver.Cent.R.R.vs.Clay:21 Vt.30.
Contra, see
Gent vs. Mut. Ins. Co. :107 Ill. 652.
The custom of granting special charterswhich is
now prohibited by the constitutions of most of the
Statescreating as it did certain privileged organiza-
tions,gave rise to the term franchiseand in incorporat-
ing under tnese special charters or franchises,Lo ex-
press words weire necessary; any words describing the
purposes of the legislature were sufficient. 73 Ala. 325.
And in cases where the requirements of an act necessi-
tated incorporation, the right could be U thered from
the purpose. ConL=.vs.W.C.R.R. 3 Grant (Pa. )200.
Except where organized under general lawsthe
legislative recognition of a corporation as existing
dispenses with further proof of" incorporation.
Peo.vs.Farnham:35 Ill. 562.
But in cases of organization to be perfected under
general laws,legislatite recognition cannot confer
valid it y.
R.R.Co.vs.Supervisors: 37 Cal. 354.
The era of special charters lias passed as to their
grantingOut we still observe their operation aixi re-
mark on the prodigality of legislatures in granting
away the people's rights.
In discussing tne right of a railroad corporation
to exercise certain powersM Cay J.says "There is in
this country reasons for strictly construing charters,
and for confining corporations to their powers,which
does not exist in any other.
Under other forms of governmentif a charter is
found to nave privileges which prove dangerous)it is
within the power of the State to alter or repeal it.
But getting their grants,as most of our corpora-
tions do, from the State, they are held to ue contracts,
add it is not in the power of t.c State under the
Federal Court to interfere materially witA the grant
however improvident or unwise it may prove to be
For these reasons it has in this country
as well as in England ever been considered t-ie vuzy
highest public policy to keep a strict watch upon
corporations and confine them within their apparent
b Ou ad s. "
Ga. Cent. R. R. Co.vs. Collins.
This decision of Judge M Cay is a natural result
of tne famous Dartmouth College case which might be
well designated as t.,e elixir of corporate life.
Previous to tne rendering of this now famous
decision in 1804,corporations were few aind unimportant
in this country.
In fact during the entire Provincial periodnot one
corporation was organized: but this unexpected and far
reaching decision gave a value to corporate franchises
beyond the possibility of estimate. It placed the
creature of the State beyond the control of the State,
and it may be justly credited with many of the evils
which obtain in this branch of the law.
The incidental concessions which have been since
made are insignificant compared with the results of
this case. Under the protection of this casehas
grown up a system of power compared ,vith which in many
cases the States that conferred tiem are norainal. By
the construction put upon tue cnarter tne government
frequently finds itself stripped by unwisejcareless or
vicious legislation of all authority:- all because of
the application to charters of private corporationsof
a provision of the United States Coiurt which was in-
tended to prevent the repudiation of just debts and
cont rac t s.
Althougii many professional men strenuously main-
tain tnat the Dartmouth College case should be reversed;
that the principle of a charter of a private corporation
as a contract is the result of an unwarrented stretch of
a provision of the Constitution) still it has become so
well settled in our jurisprudence and such vast inter-
ests iave grown up in the assurance and belief of its
stability,that the principle is now axiomatic in
American jurisprudenceor as the court says in Stone
vs.Miss.101 U.S.816: "The doctrines announced by tnis
court more thian sixty years,.agohave become so embedded
in the law of this country as to make them to all in-
tents and purposesa part of the Constitution itself."
OThe security of property rests upon it and every
successful enterprise is undertaken in tie unshaken
belief that it will never be forsaken."
The Binghamton J~i~ge 3 Wall.373.
A brief survey of the leading cases coimiencing
with this case and following along through the ElevatOr
cases:94 U.S. ll3,the Gran-er cases:94 U.S.155 and 16L
and 179 and 180,and the R.R.commissioners' cases:116
U.S.307,shows us that while the first decision is up-
heldthere is ground for the criticism that in the
later cases tiie court has been inconsistent.
Public opinion sooner or later insensibly moulds
the law. Judicial tribunals cannot be absolutely
beyonrl its influence,as the law is merely a reg,,ulation
of rights.
While the decision of the leading case, in the
principlehas never been overruled, the teniency is
nmanifested in all the cases to limit the powers by a
construction strict in its terms.
As early as the Charles River Bridge casell Pet.
420,we find the court holding that all grants are to be
construed most strictly against the grantee,thus effec-
tually shutting out corporations,who,,,iile not daring
to make their desired power tne subject of express
provisionsso coneeal them in a skillfully drawn char-
ter as to bring them within the principle of contract
inviolability of the College case.
In the Warehouse aid Granger cases we find
another seeming concession to puolic opinion, in the
exercise of the controlling and restraining powers of
the legislatures as denominated by the Supreme Court.
They meet public approval,but are not logical or con-
sistent and. in every case are accompanied by a vigorous
dissent of a strong minority.
These cases proceed upon the tiieory that where
one devotes his property to a pu lic use he must submit
to public regulation. Then altiough the title and
possession are protected by the law, the use and income
are not,and of wiat value is tie constitutional pro-
vision protecting pro-e-ty under these decisions.
In the Granger case the court held that the cases
then before them, were not governed by the College caseas
their charters contatued no contracts ,making the dis-
tinction in the use of private property for a public
use makes it of public interest while holding the
College a strictly private corporation.
If this doctrine of devotion to a public use
is to be the test of anoiiaplied right of the legisla-
ture to controlthe limits are only determined by the
courts holding as to the nature of the ousiness. These
limits are undefined and the virtual decision of tnese
cases may be said to rest upon the police power.
Is not the result of these cases to hold private
corporations subject to t~ie same control as public
corporations by holding tne: to be public whenever it
can be found taat their purpose in business affects
lie coamiunity generally-
These later decisions have aad the n .tural effect.
They have discouraged corporate investmentsand have
rendered corporate rignts and franchises less valuaole.
Whethier tney iave proportionately benefited the public
is questionable.
The opponents of corporations while applauding
these cases,whicih are deemned by the courts deciding
them to be consistent wita the early case,believe they
see in these later cases principles which will ultimate-
ly lead to t .e reversal of the original doctrine.
Chapter V.
Statutory Aid and Restriction.
The Dartmouth College case produced a corporate
boom that became the subject of serious alarm. As is
usually the case resort was had to the leg.islatures and
a series of acts followed varying greatly in heir scope
and provisions)but all having the same intent - the
curbing of t'he corporation.
As it is impossible within the limits of this
thesis to give even a skeleton view of the provisions
of the different states,in the consideration of this
phase of corporation lawthe statutory provisions of
New York will be considered almost exclusively.
But these provisions embody almost all those
which have been enacted in the other states and in some
cases are in advance of the legislation of the country
in general.
Vast as they are,the limitations imposed by strict
construction of the charters are of secondary importance
compared with these statutory enactments.
By her constitution of 1821,New York required a
two thirds vote of each House to grant a charter. This
failing to restrict,the constitution of 182u following
the suggestion of Judge Story, incorporated the favorite
clause giving the right to alter,amend,or repeal the
chart er.
This provision is almost universal and its appli-
cation involves in many cases the question of corporate
life or death.
From 1840 to 1860 these reserved powers were ap-
propriately modified. As public policy demanded
costly works of internal improvement to be undertaken
by private corporationsthey were given certain privi-
leges absolutely.
This power of repeal and amendrment has its limits
as decided by tie U.S.Supreme Court and such legislative
action must be made in good faith - free from oppression;
must not divest property rights acquired under the ope-
ration of the charter or deprive the corporation of the
benefits of contracts lawfully made.
Snields vs.0hio:,5 U.S.319.
Sinking Fund Cases:99 U.S.700.
In the decision of the case of tne Spring Valley
Water Works vs.Schollter 110 U.S.348, the Supreme Court
seems to have departed somewhat from the doctrine of
the above cases, for in this case they held that under
the amendatory clause, such as prevails in every state,
the legislature had power to regulate and reduce the
rates which the company was authorized in its charter
to charge,and upon the faith of which the vast sums had
been expended in the construction of the worksand in
addition it neld that such rates were to be detemined
by the officials of the city desiring tne water.
Now these off iials owe their office to the peo-
ple,and naturally enoeavor to placate them at the cor-
poration's expense.
This seems to be open deprivation of property
without due process of law and is a most threatening
aspect for the corporation.
General Provisions of tlie Laws.
A certificate or articles of incorporation is
prepared which must be signed by a certain number of
incorporators,usually setting forth:
1.Name of the corporation.
2. Purpose.
3.Place of Business.
4.Term it is to exist.
5.Names and residences of the subscribers and
number of shares taken by each.
6.Number of directors,and names and residences of
those chosen for the first year.
7.Amount of capital stock and number of shares
into which it is divided at its par value.
8.That the required portion of the capital stock
has been paid into the state treasury.
About the only unanimity in these regulatory pro-
visionsaside from the power to repeal and amend which
in many cases is a constitutional provision)is in the
provision which makes eacn1 stockholder liable to the
amount equal to his stock in addition to his common
law liability for unpaid subscriptions.
This liability continues until all the stock is
paid in fulland instead of working as was the inten-
tion of the legislatures which passed itit tends not
to the iimmediate payment of subscriptionsbut to a delay
in the same-as the liability continues so long as one
stockholder has failed to pay up in full.
It is only a question of time~and prouably of a
very short time,in New York at leastbefore the statutory
liability will be done away with and the co,mon law
liability on unpaid subscriptions alone exist.
. The statutory liability is subject to release by
agreement of the parties and is not enforceable to pay
damages recovered against the corporation in tort.
The courts in somre cases do not seem to distin-
guish between the nature of the conmon law liability and
the statutory liability. The coi mmon law liability was,
in most casesa fund which could be only reached by an
action prosecuted for the benefit of all parties inter-
ested,while the statutory liability is a fund which any
creiditor may reach and in the latter case)if the stock-
holder sue as lso_ a creditor of the corporation,he has
quite as good if not a better right since he has pos-
sessionto tne fund pursued as the pursuer.
Tie creditor is on te same footing as the stock-
holder creditor as to legal rights and the stockholders
being in possession iias a superior equity.
However the stockholder must be an actual creditor
of the company and if the balance after deducting his
claim is in the company's favorhe cannot have a setoff-
Wheeler v.Miller 90 N.Y.
These principles are illustrated in the case of
Agate v.Sands 73 N.Y. wnere thie stockholder held five
thousand dollars worth of stock and was a creditor to
the extent of ten thousandi dollars. He was tnerefore
allowed a set-off.
There are certain preliminary requisites to enti-
tle a creditor to recover.
He must in most states and courts si:ow:
l.Capital was not paid in.
2.Debt sued upon is a contract debt.
3.Contracted to be -aid within a year.
.. Defendent was a stockholder when the debt was
made or contracted.
5.Suit is brought within olle year after debt be-
came due.
6.Judgmfent has been recovered.
7.Execution was issued and returned unsatisfied.
8.Recovery of sucn judgment was renuiered impossi-
ble by act of the defendent.
Cuykendall vs.Corning 88 N.Y.129.
The Articles of Incorporation are a contract.
First: Between the State and the corporationthe
state agreeing not to impair any privileges granted
and the corporation agreeing to perform tile objects of
its corporation. 4 -Wheat. 518.
Secondly: Between the stock.iolders. They are
Oouni to acquiesce in the acts of the majority,if legal,
and be governed by the laws whici the majority may law-
fully enact.
Thirdly: The whole agree with each other that
they vwill apply the funds of the company to its legiti-
;,2te objects and purposes and not otherwise.
Young vs.Harrison:u Ga.130.
From the nature of these Articles of Incorporation
as is said by the court in a Georgia case, the corpora-
tions are apt to forget the fundamental law of their
being. In the daily habit of transacting business in
tiie namie of tae corporation as though it was an indi-
vidual,they are apt to sli~deinto the notion that a cor-
poration is an individual in all respects so far as
Dusiness matters are concerneo.
Under these laws creditors may elect to bring
suits in equity against all the stockholders in the
name of all the creditors for the accumulation and dis-
tribution of the entire assets of the corporation.
Such actions must be brought against all the
stockholders of the same class for the benefit of all
creditors having a like interest.
When a suit of this character is brought courts of
equity will restrain independent suits against stock-
holders as they interfere with the accounting which, is a
.necessary incident of the equity procedure.
Farnsworth v.WVood:9I N.Y.308.
Actions to enforce the liability of stockholders
should not be confused with actions to enforce the
liability of directors for failure to comply with tnle
haws. The latter class of actions are actions in the
nature of a penalty aryi cannot be combined with the
action against the stockholder.
The action against the stockholder being on con-
tract is not confined to the courts of any one state,but
is maintainable in all courts~provided that it shown
that all steps required by the statute under which the
corporation was incorporated ,have been taken.
In some of the states very stringent statutes
iiave been enacted as is illustrated in the Act of the
Mass.Legislature of 1821,which made the mrmbers of all
manufacturing corporations personally liable on all
the contracts of the corporationand subjected their
property to attachment on mesne process and their per-
sons to arrest and imprisonment,and allowed the sale of
their property on execution issued in actions against
the corporation.
Naturally this act was fiercely assailed on the
ground that it was not due process of law - procedure
against a man who by no possiOility could be heard.
The Supreme Court sustained the acthowever.
Child vs.Coffan:17 Mass.u/1.
Iarcy vs.Clark:17 Mass. 330.
Ultra Vires Doctrine.
The old idea of a corporation was an artificial
oeing created by the king either directly or indirectly,
and capable of acting only in a well understood mainer,
but having conformed to t.le prescribed regulationsen-
dowed with the same rights and liabilities as individ-
uals.
But with tae extension of corporations jame tnc
necessity of restriction as a means of protection to tne
public.
The old method of restriction was to pass pro-
hibitory laws expressly designating wnat was forbidden;
but the marvelous increase in numoers and objects ren-
dered this method impracticable and impossible.
Out of necessity sprung our present system of
powers eit.er express or imaplied in tne grant or fran-
chise and from the overstepping of tuese powers arose
our modern doctrine of Ultra Vires.
Chief Justice 'Marshall in the case of Head vs.
Insurance Co. in speaking of the powers of the defen-
dent said "It may be said to be precisely what the in-
corporating act has made it;to derive all its powers
frcm that actand to be capable of exercising its
faculties only in the manner whicni tnlat act authorizes."
In early times if the form was complie(. with
nothing furt-,er was required,but at present not the
letter of the law but the intent and spirit are the de-
termining factors.
All powers are not expressed. Such as naturally
flow from the conduct of the business; such as are es-
sential to its success or creationare embraced within
its powers the same as the enumerated powers.
What is unautiorized or ultra vires, is void-
Parliament formerly forbade by express statute certain
acts. Today the courts declare similar acts unauth-
orized and void - another exa.ple of judicial legisla-
tion based upon the samie grounds which created the
original prohibitory statutes~namely public policy.
People vs.Manhatten Co.:9 Wendell 35I.
There is but one course of reasoning by which
this position can be sustained)but happily that is
sufficient.
Charters are special privileges conferred by a
sovereigntygiving advantages to a certain few. The
policy of the law is not to grant privileges unless it
appears that such grants will be beneficial to the
public as a wniolei that public policy demaids it.
Most certainly then the public demands that such privi-
leges shall not be abused and that the beneficiaries
keep within the prescrioed regulations wnich must be
taken as the comparative standard of the privilege and
puOlic welfare.
Story on St.and Const.Law:2 Ed.1292.
The above doctrine obtains in England and is laid
down in the leading case in this country.
Bissell vs.Iake Shore R.R.Co.22 N.Y.258.
Acts apparently within the powers of the company,
but ultra vires because of some fact lying peculiarly
within the knowledge of the corporate officers do not
admit the defense of ultra vires. Any acquiescense
by the corporation is fatal to the setting up of the
doctrine of estoppel as mutuality is absolutely essen-
tial. Estoppel upon general principles should be
reciprocal.
Although a corporation may successfully invoke
the defense of ultra vires~it is still subject to a
suit for money had and received when it refuses
either to return what it has received or to perform.
mayor vs.Ray:19 Viall.40i8.
Taxation.
Usually of two kinds:
l.The organization tax.
2.The annual franchise tax determined accord-
ing to statutory provisions.
After prolonged litigation, the franchise tax has
been declared constitutional,as not oeing a tax upon
property.
It is levied upon the corporation alone and one
of the penalties provided for its non-payment is the
forfeiture of its charter. The amount is determined
by the earning capacitywhich in turn is evidenced by
the dividends (as far as taxes are concerned). The
payment of this franchise tax or license does not exempt
them from local taxation.
People vs.Warren:109 N.Y.576.
The general scieme of corporate taxation is based
upon the value of the capital stock and surplus of the
corporation.
Certain deductions are allowed,sych as the value
of the real estate which is taxed where is situated.
No exemption is allowed for debts.
People vs. Asten:100 N.Y. 597.
Mortgageing of Corporations Property.
The courts of some states particularly of New
Yorkhave shown a tendency to limit the right to mort-
gagejas conferred by laws, to certain purposes. ThougL
they have not attempted to lay down any rules they have
refused to uphold the mortgages thus made in several
instances. In 65 N.Y.43 the Court of Appeals held
that a mortgage could not be made to raise money to
carry on a business,but it hardly seems possible ttat
the legislature in giving this power intended to limit
it any Lore than the business of the corporation was
limited,and not to allow the company to mortgage for any
purpose it was authorized to transact Dusiness for.
However the contrary construction has been put
upon these statutes by the courts. 99 N.Y.5z7.
Cons olidat ion.
Consolidation is freely allowed in almost all the
statesupon compliance with the different statutes
prescribing the manner, time and purposes of tne con-
solidation.
Full reports of these proceedings must be filed
in the proper officesand all statutory requirements as
to notice etc. complied with.
Another distinguishing characteristic of the
modern business corporation is the ability to hold stock
of certain other prescribed corporations engaged in
enterprises incidental or related.
Preferred Stock.
Corporations may at the time of incorporation
classify their stock, thus creating preferred stockor at
any time,upon the unanimous consent of all the share-
holdersnew preferred stock may be issued.
The subject of preferred stock naturally divides
itself into two divisions.
l. Power to issue.
Issuance cannot be justified except for
the purpose of strengthening the position of the com-
pany or enlarging its ousiness.
The right to issue is usually inserted in the
charter but if stock has been issued upon a certain
basis,any rights which have attached cannot be impaired
except for good reasons and by proper authority.
2
.Rights of holders.
Rights of holders of preferred stock extends only
to priority of dividends. As to the assets or capital
they stand upon the same footing as other stockholders.
While the concern is going,if there are any pro-
fits,the holders of the preferred stock must be paid.
If there are no profits they get nothing as they are not
creditors but partners.
On dissolution profits cease, the capital remains,
but as the preferred stockholders were prohibited from
drawing on it while the corporation was in existence
they are denied the privilege when it is defunct.
Dividends in arrears may and probably are enti-
tled to payment when profits are realized, such payments
to be made after payment of current dividend.
In addition to the right to issue prefered stock
the corporations are frequently granted the right to
iiicrease or diminish their capital stock.
With relation to this privilegeit has always been
the law and recognized as founded upon public policy
that in any proceedings to increase or diminish, the
shareholders shotild.have a. voice.
Eidman vs.Bowman:58 111.414.
And the minority have been held to have the right
to defeat any action distasteful to them.
This rule has worked much hardshipas a few block
any change. Majority rule is a feature of corporate
management and should obtain in these casesprovision
being made for the purchase of the stock of the dis-
satisfied stockholders at a fair valuation.
If such course is not taken the inevitable result
is the wrecking of the corporation with all its evils,
not only to the stockholders but the business coiwiunity
at large .
Another right and interest of the stockholder
is that upon the increase of new stock he has the right
to a proportionate share of the new stock determined
by his holding of the Original stock.
The corporation cannot exclude stockholders from
this privilege. A_,share in the stock is a share in
the power of increasing it when the corporation deter-
mines to do so. The increase of capital is intended
for the benefit of the joint owners.
S.P.States vs.Bank:lO Ohio 91.
Power to issue bonds is another statutory grant
and is frequently used to evade the prohibition against
the issue of preferred stock.
This power should be done away with as the stock-
holders and the bondholders have adverse interests in
cases where the business is close.
The stockholders control the board of directors
and as bonds draw interest regardless of profits while
the stock does notthere is an inevitable clash.
Assignments.
At common law corporations could make assignnints.
unless expressly restricted by enactments,but at present
in nearly all the states,statutes either prohibitory or
restricting such assignments are on the statute books.
Exceptions are made in cases of a few certain
classes of corporations as religious corporations and
in New York under the present statutewliether intention-
ally or by an oversightit certainly seems by a proper
const ruction of the statute that corporations as a whole
may make assiganents.
This should be the law,guarded by proper restric-
tions as in the case of an appointment of receiversper-
sons wholly incO~mpetentunacquainted with the business
and possibly hostile to the interests of parties in-
volved,are often appointed.
Among some of the other numerous privileges and
restrictions created by statute are the right of agents
to act and bind the corporation without the corporate
seal, or vith a seal,where authority has not been con-
ferred by an instrument under seal.
Bank vs. Dandridge:12 Vrieat. 64.
The only express limitation upon these acts is
the same here as in cases of natural persons. They must
be acts within the apparent or express scope of the
agent's powers or duties.
McCullogh vs.Moss:5 Denio 567.
Corporations may contract with one another even
though their boards of directors consist of the same
individuals in whole or partsubject to the provision
that the acts of these respective board do not involve
hostile interests.
Alexander vs.Williams:14 Mo.App.13.
Corporations are liable for frauds of agents act-
ing within the apparent scope of their authority, such as
-iisrepresentation in notice of judicial salecalculated
to destroy competition.
James vs.R.R.Co.6 Wall..752.
Procuring donations by threatening a change of location,
etc. Union Pac.R.R. 3 Dillion (C.C.)343.
Corporations are now liable in actions of tort, the
same as natural persons,the old doctrine that because of
their peculiar character they could not perform any act
involving moral qualities being entirely obsolete.
Johnson vs. StLouis Des.Co.2 Mo.App. 565.
Although the liability to suit and the power to
sue existed at conmon law) they have been made the sub-
jeat of express provisions in all the statesin some
taking the character of statutory provisions while in
others they are found in the constitution.
The powers have been extended and we find an aliost
universal provision that suit may oe brought in any
county in which the corporation does business.
Watered Stock.
Mjany states have constitutional provisions declaring
watered stock and bonds voidbut the courts will not
enforce them because the remedy is so sweeping and
disastrous that the protection of innocent holders re-
quires the practical nullification of the law by judicial
cons tnu ction.
The remedy seeks to cure instead of' to prevent.
If statutes were passed prohibiting the issue of all
stock and bonds for labor property or contract work,
unless before such issue it shall have been decided by
a state board or conmissionthat the value of the work,
labor or property is equal to the par value of the stock
or bonis,I think the evil would be effectually remedied.
Consolidation was not allowed at commuon law but
is generally at present by statutes regulating the man-
ner and extent of such consolidations.
Such consolidations being lawful,the new company
succeeds to all the rights and becomes subject to all
the liabilities of the combining companies.
No difficulty arises where each of the combining
companies were created under the same general laws of
a stateOut in cases of consolidation of corporations
ortonized under special charters,many delicate questions
arise.
Without entering into a discussion of the cses,
the general doctrine may be stated that the law existing
at the tinm of the consolidation is the determining
measureexcept as to rights vested under other laws.
Although consolidation is generally authorized,
corporations have no power to enter into partnership
unless expressly authorized.
"A partnership and a corporation are incongruous.
Such a contract of partnership is inconsistent with the
scope and tener of the powers expressly conferred and
the duties expressly enjoindd upon a corporation either
business or public. In a partnership each member
binds the firm when acting within the scope of the
business. A corporation must act through the directors
or authorized agents and no individual members can as a
member bind the corporation.
The whole policy of the law creating corporations
looks to the exclusive management of the same by off icem
of the corporation as provided for by its charter.......
Any arrangement by which the control of tle
offices of corporations should be taken from the stock-
holders and officers would be hostile to our incorpora-
tion acts and the decided weight of authority is tat a
corporation has not the power to enter into a partner-
ship.' 8 S.W. Rep. 396.
Dissolution of a Corporation.
This subject is considered in a very different
light at the present time than at the cornion lawas is
seen in a reference to Kyd on Corporations 447-8 where
the author holds it 'as a proposition so plain that it
seems rediculous to mention itthat the corporation was
of i:ecessity dissolved by the death of its emebers."
But such a state of affairs canauot exist in a
corporation having capital stock,as slares pass by as-
si-alnent,becluest,or descent,and must of iecessity always
oelong to soue person who will thus be constituted a
member of the corporation.
Boston Glass Co.vs.Landon:2 Pik. 52.
The only methods of dissolution existing at the
present tiie are as follows:
1. Death by operation of statute.
2. Surrender of franchisewith consent.of the
granting power.
3.Forfeiture of franchise.
Much doubt exists as to the power of a majority
to dissolve as against the wishes of a minority except
in cases of insolvency or unprofitableness.
Tredwell vs.!Aanf. Co.7c-Gray 405.
On the dissolution at common law the realty re-
verted to the original gtantor and the persoiialty to
the crownbut tiis doctrine does not obtain in the civil
law. "On the contrary the property of the corporation
belongs to its members and must be divided among them.
But at the present timeequity will enf rce all con-
tracts and treat all the corporate property as a fund
to be divided among tie creditors and case of a sur-
plus stared. with thle stockholders."
Stark vs.Burke: 5 La.Annual 740.
In England the crown may create but cannot at
present dissolve a corporation or without its consent
alter or waend its charter. Of course Parliament in
the exercise of its all supreme power may dissolve or
amend but it has rarely done so.
Chapter VI.
Conclusion. Present Tendencies.
In the preceeding pages -are given a crude outline
of the development and growth of the corporation from
an unimportant and almost unobserved phase of comaercial
activity to the dom inating power which it now is.
This wonderful growth has not been without incident
and has not failed to excite alarm. Tae frienyis and
foes of associated capital have carried on a hot battle
and the contest is still raging. Many remedies lave
been su6ested, theories and experiments tried and
proved uselessbut a remedy seems to be coming in the
natural course of events despite legislative restric-
tions.
Consolidation on a colossal scale is the only
seeming solution. As long as combinations can be made,
competition will exist,and so long must the public pay
for the expense of such competition.
As to the quasi-public corporationsespecially
the railroadsCongress has power to organize and regulate
corporatiom, appropriate for the carrying out of the
powers of the Federal goverinent.
Such a corporation being designed to aid the
goverrunent in the administration of the public service
cannot be controlled by the state legislation, and herein
lies the only seeming remedy to cut off the ever grow-
ing tendency of the state legislatures to inflict bur-
dens upon corporations engaged in the public service.
Enact a national corporation law for just as long
as the tendencyof man to over-reach his neighbor exists,
just so long will stateswhich are merely collections
of individualsdiscriminate against one another.
Those are not found wanting who advocate the
abolition of corporations entirely,but this would be
cominercial suicideand as has been well said,sucn talk is
foolishness.
Because tne corporation can be used in a few in-
stances as an instrument of wrongthe vast numbers which
are guilty of no wrong should not be abolished. The
corporation is coming and not going.
Public opinion however is beginning to exert a
powerful influence with reference to corporations.
The great corporations seek to conciliate the
public and fear its condemnation. Jay Gould expressed
the idea of the successful corporation officer in his
terse phrase - "Molasses catches more flies than vinegar.-
The Granger legislation - Railroad cases - the
withdrawel of the Southern Pacific from California poli-
tics - the conciliatory tactics of the Standard Oil Co.,
are all due to public sentiment.
The successful corporations of today are managed
by honest far-seeing menwho recognize tinat honesty to-
wards the people is the best business policy.
But with reference to the Statethe attitude of
the corporation is somewhat different.
So long as the business of the private corporation
is affected by the government )so long will they con-
tinue to exert their influence in politics.
When the State refused to grant any more special
cLarters tile corporations witldrew to a large extant
from the legislatures.
With consolidation will come a lessening of con-
flict with the State.
Let us then grant corporate privileges only where
the necessity of the public overbalances the necessity
of the individual.
In all such cases make incorporation obligatory.
Make all stock corporations render full reports,
furnishing data for efficient regulation.
All other corporations should be subject to in-
vestigation but not control.
The only other remedy seems to be State Socialism.
Isaac Bromley struck the key-note of the situation
when he said - "The irregularities in the management of
corporations are due to the irregularity on tne outside
of the globe and the inside of man. Things are grow-
ing better all the time but the discussion of the cor-
poration problem needs fresh airand I should add ju-
dicial enlightenmnent.'
